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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE AND LIMITS
JOSEPH N. FOURNIER*
A DEFENDANT is sued for breach of contract. In advance of trial, is
plaintiff entitled to discover the defendant's financial ability to
respond in damages? Quite obviously the answer is no. A defendant is
sued in tort for negligent operation of his automobile. In advance of trial,
is plaintiff entitled to discover the defendant's financial ability to pay the
anticipated judgment? Here too the answer is an obvious no. In personal
injury litigation defendant may carry a public liability policy. In advance
of trial should plaintiff be entitled to discover this fact-including the
policy limits?
Recently, in California, a woman brought an action for malpractice
against her doctor, seeking damages for personal injuries.' In a pre-trial
examination, the plaintiff, through interrogatories, sought to elicit the
following information from the defendant:'
(a) Do you have malpractice insurance?
(b) If so, state the name and address of the insurer and policy limits.
The defendant objected to the interrogatories propounded but was over-
ruled. His petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to nullify the order
of the lower court which compelled him to answer the interrogatories
was denied by the Supreme Court of California.8
Is this result desirable or proper?
Under prevailing state and federal court procedures may the plaintiff
compel the defendant to disclose the existence of insurance coverage and
the extent of his policy limits in personal injury litigation by employing
the three major methods of securing pretrial discovery, viz., (1) deposi-
tion, (2) written interrogatories, and (3) discovery and production of
documents, in this instance, the insurance policy?4 Discovery procedure
also includes the order to perpetuate testimony in a contemplated action.
The purpose of this article is to examine the pertinent federal and
state rules and statutes and survey the cases in point to ascertain whether
pre-trial discovery of insurance coverage in personal injury litigation is
proper under existing discovery procedure. Our study will not encompass
the medical payment endorsement on a public liability policy which is
* Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Laddon v. Superior Court, 334 P.2d 638 (Cal. 1959).
2. Id. at 638.
3. Id. at 640.
4. See, e.g., Young, Discovery by Plaintiff of Defendant's Liability Insurance Coverage,
403 Ins. L.J. 503 (1956); Lavorci, Disclosure of Insurance Policy Limits, 415 Ins. L.J.
505 (1957); Williams, Discovery of Policy Limits, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 225 (1959).
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not an indemnity for negligence but rather a contract for payment by the
insurer though the insured may be without fault.
I. RULES AND STATUTES ON DISCOVERY
A. History of Discovery
Historically, discovery branched off from the auxiliary jurisdiction of
the court of chancery. It was devised to overcome defects in the rigid
common law procedure. Initially, discovery was used in equity in aid
of the principal common law action, then for the taking of testimony
of witnesses in advance of trial, and finally to perpetuate testimony in
aid of a contemplated action. 5 These basic principles are today codified
in most jurisdictions." New York was the first state to embark on
procedural reform by adopting the Code of Civil Procedure of 1848.'
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' represent the most recent im-
portant procedural innovation. A majority of the states have patterned
their practice after one or the other. To some the federal rules are a
procedural utopia of liberalism, while New York practice, including dis-
covery procedure, has been depicted as outmoded 9-a view, however, not
shared by all scholars.1"
B. Applicable Federal Rules
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part
that the deponent may be examined regarding any unprivileged matter
which is relevant to the pending action, whether the matter relates to the
claim or the defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of
any other party. It is not a basis for objection that the testimony will
not be admissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Rule 26 permits the taking of testimony by oral deposition or written
5. State v. Second Judicial Dist., 69 Nev. 204, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); 1 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence §§ 190-92 (5th ed. Symons 1941).
6. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 288-328. See also Annot.,
66 A.L.R. 1264 (1930) ; Annot., 1910 L.R.A. 462. Prior to the merger of law and equity in
New York, effected by the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1848, infra note 7,
the procedural device for obtaining disclosure was the Equitable Bill of Discovery. N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 345 now provides that an ancillary action to obtain discovery under oath
in aid of prosecuting or defending an action cannot be maintained. Therefore, the right to a
bill of discovery no longer survives in view of the complete remedy afforded by existing
statutes. Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. George I. Fox, Inc., 245 N.Y. 215, 156 N.E. 670 (1927).
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 379.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952).
9. Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and The Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 346, 352 (1950).
10. See, e.g., Rothschild, Federal Wonderland, 18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 16 (1952).
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interrogatories while rule 33 provides that any party may serve upon
any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the one upon
whom such interrogatories have been served. Such interrogatories, how-
ever, are limited to matters which can be inquired into under rule 26 (b).
Rule 34 states: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor... the court in which an action is pending may... order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing,
by or on behalf of the moving party, any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts . . . which constitute or contain evidence relating to
any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted .by
Rule 26(b) ......
When the desired testimony is to be taken by oral deposition, rights
under rules 26, 26(b), and 34 are limited by rule 30 which authorizes
the court to order that the deposition not be taken, or the taking thereof
be restricted, upon a showing of good cause, or bad faith on the part of
the party taking the deposition, or upon a showing that the taking of
the deposition will unreasonably annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or a party. Rule 31 has the same effect when the desired
testimony is to be taken by written interrogatories.
C. New York Statutes
The relevant New York statutes are found in the Civil Practice Act
Section 288 (testimony by deposition), Section 296 (production of
books and papers), Section 302 (manner of taking testimony including
written interrogatories), and Section 324 (power of court of record to
order production, discovery and inspection of documents). The basic
difference between the New York statutes and the federal discovery
rules is that in the former the testimony or disclosure sought must be
material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action and,
hence, admissible as evidence. Thus, in a New York suit where recovery
of exemplary damages is possible, plaintiff may not delve into defendant's
financial status in a pre-trial examination." Under the federal rules, it
11. Wilson v. Onondaga Radio Broadcasting Corp., 175 Misc. 389, 23 N.Y.S.2d 654
(Sup. Ct. 1940). Cases are legion which have held that in actions for damages for injury
to person or property, evidence that a defendant was insured against such damages is
incompetent. See, e.g., Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 95 N.E. 10 (1911).
Even on voir dire examination the plaintiff may not carry to the jury the implication that
liability insurance is carried by the defendant. Gebo v. Findilay, 257 App. Div. 66, 11
N.Y.S.2d 950 (4th Dep't 1939). Accord, Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Morrison, 26 Ariz.
281, 224 Pac. 822 (1924) ; Lord v. Poore, 9 Terry 595, 108 A.2d 366 (1954). In a matri-
monial action, the property interest of the husband will not be inquired into on a pre-trial
examination for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of alimony which the husband
should pay. Plaintiff wife must first establish that she is entitled to the matrimonial relief
she seeks. 4 Carmody, New York Practice § 1236, at 2806 (2d ed. 1932). Wenglinsky v.
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suffices if the information sought by an examination is relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action, and it is not necessary to establish
the admissibility of the testimony."2
II. INJURED PARTY'S ACTION AGAINST WRONGDOER'S INSURER
There are several types of state statutes which regulate casualty
insurance carriers. Louisiana 3 and Wisconsin14 allow the victim of a
personal injury to bring a joint action against the tortfeasor and the
insurer or directly against the insurer alone. Louisiana courts have
characterized the "direct action" statute as creating a separate and
distinct cause of action against the insurer which the injured party may
elect in lieu of his action against the tortfeasor. 15 The constitutionality of
this statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States
in a case where there was diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and
the defendant-insurer but no such diversity between plaintiff and the
insured tortfeasor.' It was also affirmed where the insurance contract
was negotiated and delivered outside the state in which the action was
brought, even though the policy expressly prohibited actions against the
insurer until after a final determination of defendant's obligation to pay
personal injury damages by judgment or agreement.'7 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that where neither party is a resident
of the state in which the action is brought, the substantive law is
determined by the place where the cause of action accrued, while the law
of the forum controls procedure.'"
Wenglinsky, 282 App. Div. 1015, 126 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1st Dep't 1953) ; Safrin v. Safrin, 205
App. Div. 628, 200 N.Y.S. 51 (2d Dep't 1923); Van Valkenburg v. Van Valkenburg, 149
App. Div. 482, 133 N.Y.S. 942 (1st Dep't 1912). Cf. Kirshner v. Kirshner, 7 App. Div. 2d
202, 182 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't 1959); Jasne v. Jasne, 10 Misc. 2d 59, 174 N.Y.S.2d 822
(Sup. Ct. 1952). The rationale of the latter two cases is that the plaintiff wife should try
her right to matrimonial relief, alimony and the amount thereof at one and the same time.
12. Stevenson v. Melady, 1 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Although it is not necessary
to establish the admissibility of the testimony sought, nevertheless, it should lead to facts
or information which are themselves admissible in evidence.
13. La. Rev. Stat. § 655 (1950).
14. Wis. Stat. § 85.93 (1929), construed in Kujawa v. American Indem. Co., 245 Wis.
361, 14 N.W.2d 31 (1944).
15. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) ; Jackson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946).
16. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954). Plaintiff, a Louisiana
resident, brought an action in a Louisiana court against the insurer, an Illinois corporation.
The contract was entered into outside the state.
17. Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
18. Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956). Plaintiff was
a citizen of Virginia and defendant a Missouri corporation. The action was brought in a
federal district court in New York to enforce rights accruing under Louisiana law. Cf.
Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958).
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The second type of statute is represented by that of Minnesota 9 which
permits an action against the insurer after an execution against the
judgment debtor is returned unsatisfied, and also that of New York"0
which permits an action against the insurer where a judgment against the
insured remains unsatisfied for 30 days or more. A third type statute,
not directly touching an insurance carrier, is the New Jersey Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund Law.2 Here the victim of a personal injury
holding an unsatisfied claim or judgment in the amount of $200 or more
may proceed against the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles to
recover from the fund. It is interesting to note that where a non-resident
attempts to recover from the fund, the New Jersey court will look
to the law of the plaintiff's residence to see if New Jersey domiciliaries
are there afforded similar relief as that provided by New Jersey. If
not, and reciprocity is not granted, the non-resident plaintiff cannot
recover.
22
III. PURPOSE oF DiscOvERY
A. General
What is the purpose of discovery procedure?
In Hickman v. Taylor,23 the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that "discovery like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and
necessary boundaries."24 The several instruments of discovery "now
serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16,
to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
Plaintiff, a resident of New York, was injured in Louisiana and suit was brought in New
York. The Louisiana statute providing for a direct action against the insurer includes a
provision that "the injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right
of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish
where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile,
and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and
insurer, jointly or in solido." La. Rev. Stat. § 655 (1950). Hence, the statute creates a
substantive right and the action is local and not transitory.
As a condition precedent to doing business in Louisiana, the defendant insurer was
required to consent to suits by persons injured in Louisiana accidents. In denying plaintiff
the right to maintain the action in New York, the court of appeals said that "defendant
was never asked to agree nor did it ever agree that a direct suit could be brought against
it elsewhere than in Louisiana." 4 N.Y.2d 494, 151 N.E.2d at 883, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
19. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 60.51 (1937).
20. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(1)(b).
21. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6-79 (1958).
22. Betz v. Director of Div. of Motor Vehicles, 47 N.J. Super. 449, 136 A.2d 53
(L. 1957).
23. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
24. Id. at 507.
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device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues."25
Barron and Holtzoff26 state:
"Discovery has three distinct purposes and uses...
(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be necessary
to produce evidence only as to a residue of matters which are found
to be actually disputed and controverted.
(2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial.
(3) To secure information as to the existence of evidence that may
be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may be
procured, as for instance, the existence, custody and location of pertinent
documents or the names and addresses of persons having knowledge
of the relevant facts."
In reference to the pre-trial examination of another party, Carmody
states that "the matter upon which the examination is based . . .must
be material. Therefore, it should ordinarily be confined to the issues
raised by the pleadings. 2
Materiality means relevancy and relevancy relates to evidentiary
matter which tends to prove or disprove a proposition. Whether a propo-
sition is provable in a particular case is determined by the pleadings,
by the procedural rules applicable thereto, and by the substantive law
governing the issues in litigation. 8
B. Decisions
Decisions in both state and federal courts on the question of whether
insurance coverage and policy limits are subject to discovery under
existing rules reveal large areas of disagreement.
In the New Jersey case of Goheen v. Goheen,29 plaintiff attempted,
through interrogatories, to elicit information as to (1) whether defendant
was insured, (2) the name of the company, (3) whether the policy was in
force or cancelled, (4) whether the premium was paid up, and (5) the
amount of insurance. In granting defendant's motion to strike out the
interrogatories, the court held that the desired interrogatories were not
probative of the issue and thus irrelevant and incompetent evidence 0
On the other hand, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Layton v. Cregan
& Mallory Co.,3 in permitting discovery of insurance by requiring the
25. Id. at 501. (Emphasis added.)
26. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 641, at 263 (1950).
27. 4 Carmody, New York Practice § 1236, at 2804 (2d ed. 1932).
28. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941).
29. 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (Cir. Ct. 1931).
30. Id. at 508, 154 AtI. at 393.
31. 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
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defendant to produce the policy for examination, stated the limited
purpose of such discovery:
It is first contended by the defendant that the plaintiff is not entitled to a discovery
because it calls for matters entirely foreign and irrelevant to the issue. We do not
think so. Tle ownership of tte car was put in issue by the pleadings. If the insurance
policy shows ownership, it is admissible in evidence for that purpose.32
In 1937, the Supreme Court of California declared in Demaree v.
Superior Court,33 dealing with an order for the perpetuation of testi-
mony in a contemplated action: "We think it must be conceded that
the provisions of the policy of insurance are germane to petitioner's
cause and material to their anticipated action, when and if brought.
We are of the view, therefore, that the applicants laid a sufficient basis
for the issuance of the order providing for the perpetuation of testimony
and the production of the insurance policy. '3 4
The Appellate Division of New York in McGrath v. Vaccaro35 upheld
the plaintiff's right to discover and inspect defendant's liability insur-
ance policy where the defendant had denied control of the instrument
which caused the injury. Hence, liability insurance was material and
relevant to the issue of control raised by the pleadings and, therefore,
admissible in evidence.3 6
In Orgel v. McCurdy,37 a case involving pre-trial examination under
rule 26(b), the District Court for the Southern District of New York
stated:
Defendant objects to examination on these matters [liability insurance] on the
ground that the 'injection of this issue in the trial of this action will seriously preju-
32. Id. at 31-32, 248 N.W. at 539. (Emphasis added.) It is to be noted that in
producing the policy defendant may also be disclosing the policy limits. Even so, such
disclosure is only ancillary to the real dispute which is the ownership of the automobile
placed in issue by the pleadings. It is not in any way connected with defendant's financial
responsibility.
33. 10 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d 605 (1937).
34. Id. at 103, 73 P.2d at 607.
35. 270 App. Div. 948, 62 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1946). Accord, La Fata v. News
Syndicate Co. Inc., 269 App. Div. 818, 56 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1st Dep't 1945).
36. The case of Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2d Dep't 1946),
was misconstrued in 415 Ins. LJ. 505, 507 (1957). Plaintiff fell on a stoop, control of
which defendant had denied. The court held that plaintiff's motion for examination before
trial of the defendant on the matter of liability insurance should have been allowed. How-
ever, the question of insurance was material and relevant since defendant had denied
control of the premises. That being so, it was admissible in evidence as relevant. In Milk
Tank Serv., Inc. v. Wood, 200 Misc. 333, 107 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 1951), an examina-
tion before trial of the plaintiff was disallowed in an action to recover property danage to
a truck and cargo where the defendant sought to ascertain whether the truck and cargo
were insured, and if so, the name of the insurance company and the amount of the insurance.
Accord, Rashall v. Morra, 250 App. Div. 474, 294 N.Y.S. 630 (2d Dep't 1937).
37. 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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dice the defendant . . . in its defense and would have no probative value on the con-
tested issue of operation and control of the vehicle involved in the accident. ...
[Plaintiff] 'on the issue of liability insurance, is attempting to spell out operation and
control from the fact of insurance liability coverage, when, as a matter of fact,
whether the defendant .. . had liability insurance coverage on the vehicle in question
at the time of the accident would depend on whether the said motor vehicle was under
its operation and control.'3 8
Examination here was granted because the testimony sought by the
plaintiff could be generally relevant to the issues in the case.
A wider latitude for examination in this respect was granted by a
district court of Tennessee in Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 9
a case concerning discovery under rule 34. The court believed that
examination of the liability insurance policy of the alleged tortfeasor
was proper because it was relevant and material to the subject matter of
the litigation, and thus within the purview of rules 34 and 26(b)."
However, this liberal view was repudiated in McClure v. Boeger,4 1
which also involved discovery under rule 34. The federal district court
stated that "whatever advantages the plaintiff might gain are not
advantages which have anything to do with his presentation of his case
at trial and do not lead to disclosure of the kind of information which
is the objective of discovery procedure .... [T] o grant this motion would
be to unreasonably extend that procedure beyond its normal scope and
would not be justified."4
38. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The language used clouds the fact that the real
issues in dispute were control and operation of the vehicle in question, making insurance
coverage relevant and material, thus admissible evidence.
39. 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
40. Id. at 5. The court asserted that the policy "may afford the plaintiffs rights of
which they would otherwise not be able to avail themselves." Id. at 6. This is the first
instance in which the novel theory is advanced that knowledge of the details of the
defendant's insurance coverage is material to the plaintiff in the preparation of his case for
trial. This means plaintiff may discover insurance to evaluate his case. When Brackett
was decided, Tennessee had in force a financial responsibility law. Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 2715.49-.68 (1951). It required motorists, under certain circumstances, to show financial
responsibility by posting bonds or carrying liability insurance. The court inferred from
this a legislative intent to make insurance policies relevant in negligence cases. Comparable
legislation was then in force in over 40 of the 48 states.
This same court declared in McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), with
regard to discovery of insurance through interrogatories under federal rule 26, that "as a
general rule, the purpose of seeking information from an adversary, or a witness, is two-fold:
(1) to use it in the trial, or (2) to use it as a lead to information for use in the trial.
It is not shown in this case that the information sought about insurance would be relevant
to either purpose." Id. at 361.
41. 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
42. Id. at 613.
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In Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,43 which dealt with an order for
the perpetuation of testimony in a contemplated action, the California
Supreme Court ruled that a witness could be compelled to testify with
reference to an insurance policy. The court not only held that the
policy itself must be produced, but also that the witness should not be
permitted to restrict his testimony merely to the fact that insurance
exists. Furthermore, the court observed that "an automobile liability
policy evidences 'a contractual relation created by statute which inured
to the benefit of any and every person who might be negligently injured
by the assured as completely as if such injured person had been specif-
ically named in the policy', i.e., a contractual relation is 'created between
the insurer and the third parties'.144 However, the majority of the court
overlooked the fact that a suit against the insurer is not an action to
recover a loss under the policy, but constitutes an action for reimburse-
ment for damages sustained. 45 No liability under the policy accrues as an
enforceable claim against the insurer until judgment against the insured
becomes final,)6 and discovery of insurance may be had in a proceeding
supplementary to judgment.47
43. 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951). The Supreme Court of Nevada in State v.
Second judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952), distinguished the Superior
case on the ground that in view of Cal. Ins. Code § 11580 which provides that insurance
contracts must contain a provision to the effect that in the event of an unsatisfied judg-
ment against the insured, the plaintiff could sue the insurer, the plaintiff therefore had a
discoverable interest in the defendant's insurance policy, whereas, in Nevada, no similar
statute was in force. Nevada, however, did have a financial responsibility statute similar to
that in force in Tennessee. See Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4
(E.D. Tenn. 1951).
Under the federal rules, to obtain discovery by an order to perpetuate testimony in a
contemplated action, plaintiff is required to show a possibility that the testimony sought
might otherwise be lost. Petition of Ferkouf, 3 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). It can hardly
be contended that this possibility exists when a large insurance company is involved,
assuming, arguendo, that discovery is proper in the first instance. N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 295 provides: "Testimony which is material to an expected party in the prosecution
or defense of an action about to be brought may be taken by deposition if the taking or
the preservation thereof is necessary for the protection of his rights. Such testimony may
be taken only in pursuance of an order of the court in which the action may be brought
or a judge thereof."
44. 37 Cal. 2d at 754. 235 P.2d at 835.
45. Olds v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 67 Cal. App. 2d 812, 155 P.2d 676
(1945).
46. Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925).
47. Cal. Ins. Code § 11580 permits action against the insurer after judgment has been
obtained against the insured. Cal. Ins. Code § 11581 provides: "Upon any proceeding
supplementary to execution such judgment debtor may be required to exhibit any policy
carried by him insuring against the liability for the loss or damage for which judgment
was obtained." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 60.51 (1937) provides for examination of judgment debtor
1959]
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Maddox v. Grauman," with
respect to the discovery of insurance in a pre-trial examination under a
statute similar to federal rule 26(b), declared that: "An insurance
contract is no longer a secret, private, confidential arrangement between
the insurance carrier and the individual but it is an agreement that
embraces those whose person or property may be injured by the negligent
act of the insured. We conclude the answers to the propounded questions
are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation . . .2"
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Jeppesen v. Swanson," handed down
an exhaustive, well-reasoned opinion on discovery procedure under a
rule nearly identical with federal rule 34. Plaintiff's attorneys frankly
stated in the moving papers that the motion to inspect defendant's
liability policy was to place a value on the case for the purpose of
settlement.5 1 The Court denied the plaintiff's petition and, relying on
the Hickman5 2 and McClure53 cases, stated:
The rationale of the great bulk of federal cases dealing with the discovery rules is
that the information sought by the discovery must either be admissible on a trial of
the issues involved in the case or it must be such facts or information as will lead
to the discovery of evidentiary information in some way related to the proof or
defense of issues involved in the trial of the case.5 4
Another state court, also construing a discovery statute similar to
federal rule 34, denied a plaintiff pre-trial discovery of insurance
coverage, reasoning that it was neither material nor relevant, and was
hence inadmissible as evidence.55 In so deciding, the South Dakota
Supreme Court declared that the "plaintiff's suggestion that the policy
may afford her rights of which she would not be able to avail herself
unless she is permitted to inspect it, does not concern the pending lawsuit.
Rather it concerns a subsequent suit against the insurer--4f she prevails
in this one."56
A more liberal stand was taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
after execution is returned unsatisfied. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 775 provides for the examina-
tion of a judgment debtor in a proceeding supplementary to judgment after the docketing
of the judgment, and the examination need not await an execution being returned un-
satisfied. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 779 provides for examination of third parties, individual,
partnership or corporation, who may be holding property of judgment debtor or be indebted
to him.
48. 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
49. Id. at 942.
50. 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
51. Id. at 548, 68 N.W.2d at 653.
52. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
53. McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
54. 243 Minn. at 554, 68 N.W.2d at 653.
55. Bean v. West, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.V.2d 565 (1957).
56. Id. at 465, 80 N.W.2d at 567. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 28
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher.7 The court denied defendant's petition
for a writ of mandamus directed to the judge who had ordered the
defendant to answer plaintiffs' interrogatories containing the following
questions: (1) On the date of this lawsuit did you carry liability insur-
ance? (2) If so, with what company? (3) If you did carry liability insur-
ance, what is the policy limit for each person? The Illinois court, relying
on the Brackett," Superior"9 and Maddoxe° cases in arriving at its
decision, stated:
It is our opinion that discovery interrogatories respecting the existence and amount
of defendant's insurance may be deemed to be 'related to the merits of the matter
in litigation' . . . since they apprise injured plaintiffs of rights arising out of the
accident, otherwise unknown, and which the public policy of this State protects, give
counsel a realistic appraisal of his adversary and of the case he must prepare for,
and afford a sounder basis for the settlement of disputes. We believe that such a
construction is in accordance with the intention of the framers of the amended Rules
to give a broader scope to the practice of discovery and thereby enable attorneys to
better prepare and evaluate their cases.
61
The liberal position exemplified by the Superior case has been explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Courts of Oklahoma 2 and Florida.6" In Brooks
v. Owens,0 4 wherein plaintiff had endeavored to discover defendant's
insurance policy limits through interrogatories, the Florida Supreme
Court specifically declined to follow the Superior and Maddox decisions
and declared:
We adopt the view .. that the limits of liability insurance on a policy covering an
automobile of a defendant are not proper matters subject to discovery .... It is our
view that the rule is applicable only to those matters admissible in evidence or
calculated reasonably to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.65
Two recent decisions66 by federal district courts in Illinois demonstrate
57. 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957). The court also observed that in personal
injury litigation the insurer is virtually substituted as a party since it controls the investiga-
tion of the case and the conduct of the defense. Therefore, plaintiff has a discoverable
interest in defendant's insurance coverage as a matter of public policy. Should it not then
logically follow that plaintiff has the same discoverable interest in an uninsured defendant's
assets, who controls the investigation of the case, and the conduct of the defense?
58. Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.. Penn. 1951).
59. Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951). See note
43 supra.
60. Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
61. 12 Ill. 2d at 239, 145 N.E.2d at 593.
62. Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957). Involved here was the perpetuation of
testimony by deposition in a contemplated action for malpractice. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court denied plaintiff the right to discovery of insurance coverage.
63. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 699. (Emphasis added.)
66. Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D.
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a consistent denial of the use of interrogatories to discover the existence
and limits of any insurance. In Gallimore v. Dye,6 7 the federal court
pointed out that the presence or absence of insurance by the defendant
has no bearing on the issue of liability in negligence actions, for the
defendant's negligence "is the gravamen in such actions.""8 The court
went on to assert that "the plaintiff's cause must rise or fall on its own
merits and on the ability of the plaintiff to prove liability against the
defendant." 69 Adhering to the Gallimore case, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois in Roembke v. Wisdom70 thus sum-
marized the significance of the discovery procedure:
The purpose of discovery is for preparation for trial. A party by use of the dis-
covery rules, may obtain direct evidence for use in trial, or may obtain pertinent in-
formation that will lead to evidence for use in trial. The scope of discovery is
broad, and so long as information sought by interrogatories or deposition can reason-
ably be said to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence it must be given ....
The existence or non-existence of liability insurance is not an evidentiary matter that
may be used at the trial, nor is it relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action.7 1
Arizona and Connecticut, whose procedural rules are patterned after
the federal model, have similarly construed their rules as denying the
plaintiff the right to elicit insurance information through interrogatories.
As the Arizona Supreme Court stated in Di Pietruntonio v. Superior
Court,7  "the decisions holding against discovery ... are better reasoned
than those holding to the contrary. 7 3 The Superior Court of Delaware74
283 (E.D. Ill. 1958). Both cases concerned the discovery of insurance and policy limits
through interrogatories under rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
67. 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
68. Id. at 286.
69. Continuing this line of reasoning the court said it failed "to see how the presence
or absence of liability insurance can have any probative value in this case. It does not,
and could not have any bearing on the liability or non-liability of the defendant; nor does
this court conceive how receiving answers to the interrogatories objected to here could
lead to any matters having any probative force in deciding the issues in this case, nor aid
the plaintiff in establishing his cause by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence
which, under the law, he is required to do, before he is entitled to collect anything from
the defendant." 21 F.R.D. at 286.
70. 22 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
71. Id. at 199.
72. 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958). The court stated that: "Our public policy .. .
is diametrically opposed to respondent's position and Rule 26(b) . . . construed most
favorably in favor of the right of discovery in the instant case does not justify it." 84 Ariz.
at 298, 327 P.2d at 751.
73. Ibid.
74. Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959). The Delaware court in con-
struing Del. Super. Ct. (Civ.) R.33, which is similar to the corresponding federal rule
of procedure, denied plaintiff insurance coverage information sought by means of interroga-
tories. 147 A.2d at 515.
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pointed out that the prejudicial nature of any mention of liability insur-
ance in an automobile collision case, together "with a complete lack of
any showing of relevancy to the issues as framed by the pleadings or
otherwise indicated by the plaintiff" necessitated the denial of informa-
tion relating to insurance coverage and policy limits by means of inter-
rogatories.
75
Disclosure of insurance coverage throuih depositions was rejected by
the Connecticut Superior Court in Verrastro v. Grecco.76 The court main-
tained that the "good cause" required by the prevailing rules of
practice included a showing that the "disclosure sought would be of
assistance in the prosecution of defense of such action.' 77 Citing the
Verrastro decision as controlling, this same court denied a motion for
production of defendant's insurance policy in a malpractice suit where
the plaintiff attempted to show "good cause" by alleging that she needed
to discover whether a statutory violation was covered by the policy so
that it might be determined whether or not to include the violation in
her complaint as a cause of action.78
California has persisted in a liberal construction of its procedural
rules so that plaintiffs have been able to elicit insurance coverage infor-
mation, including policy limits, through the use of interrogatories. This
is aptly manifested in the recent decision of Laddon v. Superior Court.79
In following the position previously enunciated in the Superior0 case, the
Laddon court admitted that "the conclusion is inescapable that under
this [Superior] decision the insurance policy is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the personal injury action, although not strictly within
the issues raised by the pleadings."81 However, recognizing that its view-
point was perhaps somewhat tenuous, the court conceded that "while
the decisions favoring discovery are persuasive in their reasoning, we
might be inclined to follow the majority view if the question were wholly
new in California.' 82
C. Summary of Decisions
Thus, according to the authority of the preceding cases taken from
the federal district courts of Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and Ten-
nessee, and the state courts of Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
75. 147 A.2d at 515.
76. 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (Super. Ct. 1958).
77. Id. at 166, 149 A.2d at 704.
78. McKee v. Walker, 21 Conn. Supp. 168, 149 A.2d 704 (Super. Ct. 1958).
79. 334 P.2d 638 (Cal. 1959). See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text. The pertinent
rules were Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 2016(b), 2030(b) (1957), which are based largely upon the
federal rules of procedure.
80. 37 -Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951).
81. 334 P.2d at 640.
82. Id. at 639.
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Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota, it is clear that a plaintiff cannot compel disclosure of
defendant's insurance coverage.8 3 It may be argued that the evidence
elicited by such disclosure would be inadmissible, because neither material
nor relevant, unless such disclosure is required to show ownership, agency
or control of the vehicle or instrumentality involved. However, as has
been seen, the rule is otherwise in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee and the state courts of California, Illinois
and Kentucky.84 These cases hold that disclosure of defendant's insur-
ance coverage may be compelled since the evidence adduced thereby
would be relevant to the issues in litigation and within the purview of
discovery procedure.
The conflicting arguments may be summarized as follows: The pro-
ponents of insurance discovery contend that it is proper inasmuch as
(1) discovery rules were adopted as procedural tools to effectuate the
prompt and just disposition of litigation by informing the parties in
advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, and
should be liberally construed; (2) an automobile liability policy evi-
dences a contractual relationship which inures to the benefit of any
person who might be negligently injured by the insured;85 (3) discovery
of the existence and extent of a defendant's liability policy is related to
the merits of the subject matter of the litigation and is thus material and
relevant; and (4) such discovery, furthermore, would give plaintiff's
83. Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283
(E.D. Ill. 1958); McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger,
105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958); McKee v. Walker,
21 Conn. Supp. 168, 149 A.2d 704 (Super. Ct. 1958) ; Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp.
165, 149 A.2d 703 (Super. Ct. 1958); Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959);
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 263
Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649
(1955); State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); Goheen
v. Goheen, 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (Cir. Ct. 1931); McGrath v. Vaccaro, 270 App.
Div. 948, 62 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1946) ; Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957);
Bean v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
84. Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Laddon
v. Superior Court, 334 P.2d 638 (Cal. 1959); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) ; Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d 605 (1937) ;
People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) ; Maddox v. Grauman,
265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
85. If an automobile liability policy evidences a contractual relation which inures to
the benefit of any person who might be negligently injured by the insured as completely as
if such person had been specifically named in the policy, as held in the Superior case, supra
note 84, it would seem that the beneficiary of such contract must, as a condition precedent
to bringing suit against the insurer, prove the negligence of the insured.
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counsel a realistic appraisal of his case and allow a sounder basis for
settlement. While the opponents of discovery concede that the rules
should be liberally construed, they contend that discovery here is im-
proper since (1) the purpose of existing discovery rules is to eliminate
the possibility of surprise at trial by permitting all relevant facts and
information to be ascertained in advance thereof; (2) facts which have
no bearing on the determination of the action on the merits are not
subject to discovery; and (3) information is not discoverable when its
sole purpose is to evaluate a case for the purpose of settlement.8 6
From the foregoing, it can be readily seen that the crux of the con-
flicting views lies in whether or not pre-trial discovery of the existence
and extent of defendant's liability coverage touches the merits of the
plaintiff's cause of action so as to affect the amount of damages plaintiff
sustained.87 The cases holding affirmatively 8 contend that employment of
investigators, expert witnesses, photographers, and even the taking of
depositions, touches the merits of plaintiff's cause of action and, there-
fore, is material in evaluating one's case for the purpose of settlement.
If this be so, may not one argue that a defendant in an action for
damages, whether tort or contract, be made to furnish a financial state-
ment,89 even though he be an individual, partnership, or corporation?
The cases supporting the negative contend that the purpose of discovery
is to assist the parties and the court in disposing of the litigation, not
to supply information for the personal use of the litigants.90 Moreover,
the affirmative argument appears to correlate the plaintiff's damages to
the defendant's ability to pay,91 or to put it in another way, as to how
much the traffic will bear.
The law with respect to damages in the vast majority of jurisdictions
has been stated as follows:
86. The argument is also made that discovery rules are to secure a just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action, but that the word "determination" refers to the
disposition of an action in some manner over which a court has control, hence, that
"determination" does not encompass settlement. Benal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Pictures,
9 F.R.D. 726 (NJD. Ill. 1947). Moreover, the type of settlements over which a court would
have control involve claims of infants and incompetents.
87. In People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 238, 145 N.E.2d 588, 593 (1957), the
court declared: "Plaintiff with serious injuries would settle a substantial judgment against a
defendant of modest means for a fractional sum, simply because he has no knowledge of
any additional rights against the insurer."
The latter argument completely ignores the proceeding supplementary to judgment
whereby examination of the judgment debtor may be had regarding his ability to pay
which includes claims the judgment debtor may have against third parties.
88. See, e.g., People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, supra note 87.
89. See, e.g., McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
90. See, e.g., Balazs v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
91. See notes 39, 43, 48 and 57 supra.
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The fundamental principle of the law of damages is that one injured by a breach
of a contract or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have fair and just
compensation commensurate with the loss sustained in consequence of the defendant's
act which gives rise to the action.92
In other words, the damages awarded should be commensurate with the
injury sustained.93 To advance the theory that damages for personal
injury should be measured by the defendant's ability to pay is to intro-
duce a startling concept in the field of jurisprudence, no matter how
subtle the approach.
CONCLUSION
In states having direct action statutes, 4 discovery by the plaintiff of
the existence of insurance coverage is proper and warranted by con-
trolling state and federal discovery rules. By legislative mandate, the
plaintiff here has a discoverable interest. In states having statutes which
permit an action against the insurer only after a final judgment has been
obtained against the insured,95 no discoverable interest exists in advance
of trial. In such states the plaintiff may obtain the desired information
in a proceeding supplementary to judgment,96 hence pre-trial discovery
of insurance coverage is improper and unwarranted under existing dis-
covery procedure. As a practical matter, whenever an accident is re-
ported, the insurer, in most cases, takes over the investigation, interviews
the witnesses, if any, and prepares the case for trial. The insured must
cooperate from the very beginning or hazard a disclaimer by the
insurer. Thus, the plaintiff may acquire knowledge of existing insur-
ance through: (1) disclosure by the insured; (2) an offer to settle in
advance of trial by the insurer; (3) at a pre-trial hearing; or (4) by the
character and conduct of the defense during trial." Disclosure of the
92. 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 12, at 400 (1938).
93. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Hanna v. Martin, 49 So. 2d 585 (Fla.
1951).
94. See notes 13 and 14 supra. The situation in Villars v. City of Portsmouth, 100
N.H. 453, 129 A.2d 914 (1957), is analogous. Here the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
in a declaratory judgment action, held that the defendant city should produce the insurance
policy upon request of the plaintiff. It is pointed out in this case that under the common
law the city would not be liable, but by statute, if a policy of liability insurance had been
procured by defendant city, liability might exist to the limit of the policy.
95. See notes 19, 20 and 47 supra.
96. See note 47 supra.
97. In states having compulsory insurance statutes in force the plaintiff will have
knowledge of the existence of insurance coverage and at least the minimum of the policy
limits as therein prescribed. See, e.g., Teller v. Clear Service Co., 9 Misc. 2d 495, 173
N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Here, plaintiff applied for preference at a pre-trial hearing
under pre-trial procedure adopted by the Justices of the Appellate Division for the First
Department on January 5, 1958. The court declared: "Refusal by a defendant to disclose
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policy limits in advance of trial is difficult to justify. It can have no
possible bearing on the issue of defendant's negligence even when owner-
ship, agency or control are in dispute. Defendant's ability to pay or
the evaluation of plaintiff's cause have never been within the purview
of discovery procedure. While the rules should be given a liberal con-
struction, they should not be prostituted for purposes not within the
declared and recognized objectives for which they were adopted.9s
It follows then that in the absence of a direct action statute, or where
ownership, operation or control are not in dispute, pre-trial discovery
of insurance coverage should be prohibited. Where ownership, operation
or control are in dispute, or where a direct action or analogous statute
is involved, pre-trial discovery should be limited to establishing the
fact that insurance coverage existed.
The contention that compelling disclosure of insurance coverage in
advance of trial violates defendant's constitutional rights"9 was decided
adversely to defendant in People v. Fisher.10 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of the United States held in Watson v. Employer's Liab. Assur.
Corp.,' that Louisiana's direct action statute 2 did not contravene the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Discovery is a matter of procedure and the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that a state has full power over remedies and proce-
the amount of insurance or reinsurance carried or the concealment of any facts concerning
the financial standing of the defendant or, where there is a prima fade case and the
injuries are severe (though there may be a disputed issue of liability), the offer of a
mere nominal sum are deemed failures on the part of the defendant to cooperate and
negotiate in good faith to reduce the negligence case load. Such conduct is held to warrant
the granting of a preference or the taking of such other action as may be appropriate."
Id. at 497, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 185. The defendant here was the corporate owner of a fleet of
two taxicabs.
98. The Minnesota court, in Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 562, 68 N.W.2d 649,
658 (1955), stated: "Under the guise of liberal construction, we should not emasculate the
rules by permitting something which never was intended or is not within the declared objects
for which they were adopted. Neither should expedience or the desire to dispose of lawsuits
without trial, however desirable that may be from the standpoint of relieving congested
calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose sight of the limitations of the discovery rules
or the boundaries beyond which we should not go. If, perchance, we have the power under
the enabling act to extend the discovery rules to permit discovery of information desired
for the sole purpose of encouraging or assisting in negotiations for settlement of tort
claims, it would be far better to amend the rules so as to state what may and what may
not be done in that field than to stretch the present discovery rules so as to accomplish
something which the language of the rules does not permit."
99. Williams, Discovery of Policy Limits, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 225 (1959).
100. 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
101. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
102. La. Rev. Stat. § 655 (1950). See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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dure in its own courts, and can make any order it pleases in respect there-
to, provided that substance of right is secured without unreasonable bur-
den to parties and litigants.113 It would appear, therefore, that the ob-
jection of unconstitutionality is not well taken.
Judicial legislation regarding discovery of insurance coverage appears
to have reached its peak in the Fischer case. It is noteworthy that with
the exception of the Laddon decision,0 subsequent cases °5 have held
that discovery must remain within the limits of relevancy and material-
ity to the issues raised by the pleadings. This view is eminently sound.
Assuming, but not conceding, that discovery of insurance coverage in
advance of trial would serve the public interest, nevertheless, any change,
albeit desirable, should be effectuated by the proper rule-making power,
and not by judicial fiat.
103. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
104. See notes 1-3 supra.
105. Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. I1. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D.
283 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Ct., 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958) ;
McKee v. Walker, 21 Conn. Supp. 168, 149 A.2d 704 (Super. Ct. 1958); Verrastro v.
Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (Super. Ct. 1958) ; Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514
(Del. Super. Ct. 1959); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Peters v. Webb, 316
P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957).
